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ABSTRACT 
 
A human factors team was tasked with assessing best practices for developing a crewed space vehicle that is both 
reliable and robust. The team identified two broad dimensions of human factors are relevant to system design. Namely, 
the attributes of the product, and the processes used to develop the product. The “product” includes hardware, software, 
documentation, training systems, and procedures throughout all phases of the system life, including construction, 
testing, operation and maintenance. Three product attributes relevant to robustness are the extent to which task 
demands are within human capabilities, the capacity of the system to cope with unanticipated human actions, and the 
ability of the system to make use of unique human capabilities during non-routine situations. The “process” dimension 
of human factors relates to the activities that start in the early stages of design, and continue throughout the life of the 
system. There are, of course, no guarantees that a formal consideration of human factors throughout the design process 
will identify all the relevant human issues. In the absence of such a consideration, however, problems are virtually 
assured. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
NASA Procedural Requirements document 7120.5E defines a system as: “The combination of elements that function 
together to produce the capability required to meet a need. The elements include all hardware, software, equipment, 
facilities, personnel, processes, and procedures needed for this purpose” 
[1]. Thus, humans, not only as the flight crew, but also as designers, manufacturers, and ground support are considered 
part of the spacecraft system. The system qualities of reliability and robustness have been a focus of attention in recent 
years, yet it is not clear how to evaluate these qualities in a system.   
 
In 2006, the Astronaut Office at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety 
Center (NESC) to assess best practices for developing a crewed space vehicle that is both reliable and robust. For the 
purposes of this assessment, the NESC defined reliability as being “free of failures throughout its mission” and 
robustness as “tolerant of unexpected conditions should they arise”. The NESC assigned groups to the range of 
spacecraft subsystems including propulsion, structures, avionics, software, and the human element. In each case, groups 
were asked to consider how reliability and robustness can be achieved. The conclusions of the human factors group are 
briefly summarized in this paper. It is no simple matter to evaluate the impact of the engineered elements of the system, 
such as avionics, structures and software, on reliability and robustness. More complex still, however, is defining the 
meaning of reliability and robustness in terms of human factors. This paper provides a summary of an NESC-sponsored 
project to define the meaning of reliability and robustness in terms of human systems integration.  For a complete 
coverage of this topic, refer to the full report [2]. 
 
 
1.1 Scope of our analysis 
 
Human-system interactions occur in all phases of system development and operation, however the human factors team 
restricted its work to the elements that involve “direct contact” with spacecraft systems. Such interactions will 
encompass all phases of human activity during the design, manufacture, test, operation, and maintenance phases of the 
spacecraft lifespan. We therefore consider practices that accommodate and promote effective, safe, reliable, and robust 
human interaction with spacecraft systems. By restricting our scope to “direct contact” with the spacecraft, we by no 
means dismiss the importance of management and organizational factors in system performance [3]. 
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 1.2 Interaction across disciplines 
 
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) must interact with all engineering discipline areas. Some of the linkages to the other 
disciplines are readily apparent, because spacecraft propulsion, guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C), avionics, 
mechanism, life support, and software systems must be operated and monitored by the flight crew and ground support 
personnel for mission success. Likewise, all of the disciplines impact flight crew performance, health, and safety. For 
example, structures, materials, and safety and mission assurance (S&MA) affect habitability, health, and safety. 
Propulsion systems impose significant acceleration and vibration loads on the vehicle and crew during launch, again 
with obvious design implications for crew performance, health, and safety. 
 
Spacecraft human factors relate not only to flight crew, but also the personnel who design, build, operate, and maintain 
the system. During the design process, therefore, all other disciplines need to be fully aware of the impact their products 
will have on personnel (both flight crew and ground personnel) as part of the system as a whole, throughout the system 
life cycle. Therefore, HFE interacts with the other disciplines so that designs of future spacecraft systems not only 
respect human limitations, but also benefit fully from human capabilities. The influence diagram shown in Fig. 1 
illustrates the interrelations between human factors and other discipline areas for each phase of the spacecraft system 
life cycle, in terms of ground and flight crew operations.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Interactions between human factors and other disciplines. 
 2.  PRODUCT AND PROCESS IN RELATION TO RELIABILITY AND ROBUSTNESS 
  
Key attributes that ensure robust and reliable systems can be divided into attributes of product and attributes of the 
processes used to develop and operate the product. 
 
2.1 Attributes of the product  
 
The spacecraft system includes products that take the form of hardware, software, systems documentation, training 
systems, and procedures. Human factors Engineering (HFE) deals with each of these products during all phases of the 
system life, and across the spectrum of operating conditions (normal, contingency, and emergency). HFE aspects relate 
to all people who come into contact with the spacecraft, including design and construction personnel, pre-launch test 
and verification personnel, astronauts and ground support personnel. 
 
A robust design is one that addresses three key aspects of HFE: 
 
1. System demands are designed to be compatible with human capabilities. The tasks demanded of people can be 
performed reliably, under normal, contingency, and emergency conditions. This attribute is supported by the use of 
HFE design analyses, HFE guidelines and standards, and thorough test and evaluation. 
 
2. The system is designed so that human capabilities can be brought to bear on non-routine, unanticipated problems. 
This is a key attribute that provides system resilience. The intelligent adaptation of humans to novel situations can 
significantly contribute to mission success in the face of situations that were not anticipated when the system was 
designed and evaluated. In contrast to automated systems, humans possess unparalleled abilities to solve problems and 
deal with unanticipated situations. A robust system keeps the flight crew and other personnel in the loop and enables 
them to take action when novel situations arise. 
 
3. The system is designed to tolerate and recover from human error. NASA’s human rating requirements for space 
systems previously specified that “space systems shall be designed so that no two failures result in crew or passenger 
fatality or permanent disability” [4]. This principle, sometimes referred to as two-fault tolerance (2FT) was also referred 
to in earlier versions of the U.S. Department of Defense Standard Practices for System Safety [5].  The NASA Safety 
Manual still requires, in certain situations,  sufficient system redundancy to tolerate two failures or two human operator 
errors (fail-safe or fail operational) when loss of life or mission critical events could occur. One-failure (fail-safe) 
tolerance is permitted in cases where the lesser consequences of system loss or damage or personal injury could occur 
[6].  
 
Table 1. Three principles of Reliability/Robustness, with examples of their application at different phases of the system 
life cycle. 
 
Design Principle System Life Cycle Phase 
 Manufacture Test Operate Maintain 
System demands are 
compatible with 
human capabilities 
and limitations. 
Knowledge, skills and 
abilities involved in 
manufacturing can be 
objectively defined and 
evaluated.  
Test and verification 
tasks are within human 
perceptual-motor 
envelope.  
Human-system interface 
are consistent with 
human performance 
standards. 
Maintenance tasks are 
within human 
capabilities. 
 
System can tolerate 
and recover from 
human errors. 
 
 
Components are 
designed to make 
incorrect assembly 
difficult. 
Test and verification 
tasks are not performed 
by the same staff who 
manufactured the 
system being tested. 
Appropriate interlocks 
make it difficult to do 
dangerous things. 
 
 
Simultaneous 
maintenance of 
redundant systems is 
avoided. 
System enables 
utilization of human 
capabilities in non-
routine and 
unpredicted 
situations. 
Construction personnel 
are able to identify and 
log problems. 
Output of test results are 
sufficiently detailed to 
enable identification of 
abnormal states. 
System keeps human 
operators in the loop 
and permits humans to 
take control in the event 
of unexpected events. 
If necessary, non-
routine trouble-shooting 
and system repair is 
possible. 
      
Error tolerance can be achieved in three ways [4]: 
 
(a) Undesired but predictable errors are blocked, such as through the use of interlocks or design features that prevent 
dangerous actions from being carried to completion. 
 
(b) Errors that are not blocked can be detected and recovered, such as through the ability to “undo” erroneous actions. 
There must be a means to detect errors and gracefully recover from errors when they are made. 
 
(c) Undesired deviations that are not blocked, detected, nor are recoverable, will have consequences that are minimized 
wherever possible.  
 
Tab. 1 lists these three broad principles of robustness, and provides examples of how they can be applied at different 
phases of the system life cycle. 
  
 
2.2 Attributes of the process 
 
To evaluate reliability and robustness from a human factors perspective, we must not only consider the attributes of the 
product as eventually delivered, but also the  human factor engineering activities that occur during the system life cycle. 
To be effective, human factors engineering processes must be integrated with other engineering activities and applied 
throughout the life cycle of the system, from concept planning, through operations and ultimately decommissioning.  
 
Fig. 2 shows an idealized product development process, proceeding from initial concept development on the left of the 
figure to operational introduction of the product on the right. Planning for the Human Factors Engineering (HFE) 
program begins at the start of the design process, and sets in train a series of critical activities, including analysis of the 
tasks that must be performed by humans, the design of the user interface, culminating in in-service monitoring. These 
processes of course, do not guarantee adequate human system integration, yet in their absence, problems with the user 
interface are virtually assured. Detailed coverage of these topics can be found in the cited report of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission [7]. For additional information, refer to the U.S. Navy Human Systems Integration Guide [8] 
and Department of Defense Acquisition Guidebook [9]. In the following pages, we illustrate by focusing on five key 
human factor activities. Refer to [2] for a treatment of all the HFE activities shown in Fig. 2.     
 
HFE program planning. HFE program planning includes identifying (1) the general HFE program goals and scope, 
(2) high-level concept of operations for the new system, (3) HFE design team skills necessary to conduct subsequent 
HFE activities, (4) engineering procedures (such as quality assurance and the use of an issues tracking system) to be 
followed, (5) description of HFE products and documentation of analysis and results, and (6) key milestones and 
schedules to ensure the timely completion of HFE products. The results of the planning activity should be documented 
in a human factors program plan that can be used to manage the overall HFE effort.  Additional information on HFE 
Program Planning can be found in the following sources [1,4,7,10,11].  
 
Operational experience review (OER) and lessons learned. New design projects should be based on a thorough 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of existing or similar designs. The Operational Experience Review 
(OER) and lessons learned activity should identify positive as well as negative experiences. In essence, the best place to 
start a design project is by understanding the lessons learned from similar systems in the past. A variety of data sources 
can be used, including: available documentation, databases and event reports and summaries, interviews, and 
walkthroughs with personnel, and communication with other facilities and organizations. The OER and lessons learned 
information should be documented to provide a clear indication of the issue identified, the design activities to which it 
is relevant, and its criticality. The OER should be maintained and made readily accessible to the design team. 
 
 
     
 Figure 2. Human Factor Activities as part of the design program. 
 
 
Function analysis and allocation. Every spacecraft system has one or more missions that it is designed to achieve. To 
achieve a mission, various functions have to be performed, such as GN&C and life support. The term function 
allocation, as used here, simply refers to the allocation of responsibility for conducting functions, or parts of functions, 
to personnel (flight and ground crew), to automatic systems, or to some combination of the two. In some cases, the best 
way may be to flexibly allocate functions so they can be performed either by the crew or automatically depending 
dynamically on the crew’s goals and priorities in the current situation. As functions are analyzed, their requirements 
become better defined. At some point, those functions or parts of a function are assigned to the available resources, 
which include hardware, software, and human elements (and, of course, combinations of them). The overall purpose of 
function analysis and allocation is to ensure that functional requirements are sufficiently defined and analyzed so that 
the allocation of functions to the available resources can take advantage of the strengths of each. In other words, make 
use of automation and human capabilities in ways that maximize overall function accomplishment. Detailed coverage of 
functional allocation can be found in the work of Billings [12], and the following sources [7, 10] 
 
Task analysis. Task analysis refers to a family of techniques that provide detailed information about what is needed to 
perform tasks. Generally, the term “task” is used to refer to a group of activities that have a common purpose. Some 
tasks are sequential and well defined, like starting a system. Other tasks are ill defined and not sequential, like fault-
detection and troubleshooting. Kirwan and Ainsworth [13] list over 40 tasks analysis techniques, each of which is suited 
to a particular situation or objective. For example, Link Analysis is a method of analyzing the layout of equipment and 
consoles based on task demands. Operational Sequence Analysis is a method of examining the detailed behavioral 
aspects of tasks that are fairly well defined and sequential. Hierarchical Task Analysis is a method of decomposing 
higher-level functions to the information and controls that personnel need to perform their tasks. Cognitive Task 
Analysis is a method for analyzing the diagnosis and decision-making process and is best suited to examining tasks that 
are very ill defined and very dependent on the expertise of the user. In combination, these methods provide powerful 
tools for identifying task requirements. Task analysis information has many uses in subsequent analyses, including: 
staffing, procedure design, training, and human error and reliability analysis. 
 
Human error and reliability analysis. Even when the system is at an early stage of definition, it is possible to broadly 
identify error risks and ensure that these are explicitly considered during the design process. As the project progresses 
through analysis to definition and design, iterative analyses will identify potential human errors and human factor risks 
in progressively finer levels of detail. The aims of a human error analysis are to identify critical areas where system 
demands may be incompatible with human capabilities, and identify critical areas where the system is vulnerable to 
human error. These could be areas where the two-fault tolerance principle is breached. Given the early stage of system 
development, the initial human error hazard analysis will be characterized by a qualitative approach applied at a broad 
level of granularity. 
 
The initial human error analysis would consider normal as well as non-normal operations in all stages of the system life 
cycle, from design, construction, operation and maintenance. The initial human error hazard analysis would draw on 
information from operational experience reviews, incident and accident databases, and relevant experience from other 
industries and settings. 
 
Two analysis techniques guide the human error hazard analysis. 
 
1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down approach, starting with a list of potential catastrophic scenarios and then 
working down to identify how these could occur. During the human error analysis, the emphasis is naturally placed on 
the human actions that could jeopardize a mission or lead to loss of life. Although probability estimates are commonly 
inserted into fault trees, even without this level of detail, fault trees can help the analyst identify situations where the 
system is vulnerable to human error. 
 
2. Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HFPFMEA) is a bottom-up approach that identifies 
how personnel interact with human/machine interfaces, what errors are possible, and what consequences would result 
from errors. Information from fault tree analyses, as well as preliminary function analysis and task analysis assists in the 
HFPFMEA process [14]. The two approaches of FTA and HFPFMEA are complementary and information from one 
approach is used to refine and guide the other.  
 
Test and evaluation. This activity is an integral part of the entire HFE process and spans the full design life cycle. 
Tests and evaluations can be conducted for a variety of purposes, including the resolution of design tradeoffs, the 
evaluation of new designs, and to provide information and feedback from users. Common test and evaluation methods 
include user interviews, surveys and rating scales, focus groups, computer modeling, and walk-throughs using 
drawings, mockups, or prototypes [15,16,17].  
 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS       
 
The work described in this paper was directed at design issues pertaining to space vehicles, however the principles are 
applicable to a wide range of products and systems, ranging from simple household objects to advanced technological 
systems. Careful attention to the design of human system interfaces can make a significant contribution to the overall 
performance of complex systems. It must be noted however that good design of or components does not guarantee the 
performance of the overall system. Furthermore, managing the performance of a highly complex system involves more 
than just ensuring adequate interface design. Organizational factors are at the heart of system performance, and while 
acknowledging this key area, we have not attempted here to deal with the organizational issues associated with the 
management of complexity. 
  
The three principles of reliability and robustness introduced in this paper represent distinct but overlapping divisions in 
the field of human factors. Over the last half century, much attention has been directed at the first and second of these 
three principles. The third principle has received less attention, yet it is important to acknowledge the positive as well as 
the negative contributions that human performance contributes to system operation. 
 
Ensuring effective human system integration requires the application of human factors principles early in the design 
process. A structured approach to human factors can save a great deal of trouble later in the life of the system in terms 
of re-design, training and safety incidents. There are of course, no guarantees that a formal consideration of human 
factors throughout the design process will identify all the relevant human issues, however neglecting these areas is 
almost certain to result in a system lacking in reliability and robustness. 
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